Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium bank runs revisited
Peck and Shell (2003) show that it is possible to get a bank run in a Diamond-Dybvig environment. The mechanism they use, however, is not an optimal one. When an optimal mechanism is used, the bank run equilibrium disappears.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011-13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nosal, Ed
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
- (wo)
-
Chicago, IL
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nosal, Ed
- Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Entstanden
- 2011
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