Arbeitspapier
Preventing (panic) bank runs
Andolfatto et al. (2017) proposes a mechanism to eliminate bank runs that occur as a coordination problem among depositors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Building on their work, we conduct a laboratory experiment where we offer depositors the possibility to relocate their funds to a priority account. We find evidence that the mechanism reduces not only bank runs that occur because of a coordination problem among depositors but also panic bank runs (Kiss et al., 2018) that occur when depositors can observe the action of others.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: KRTK-KTI Working Papers ; No. KRTK-KTI WP - 2022/13
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Behavioral Finance: General‡
- Subject
-
bank run
coordination problem
panic behavior
experimental economics
policy tools
financial stability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kiss, Hubert J.
Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael
Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
- (where)
-
Budapest
- (when)
-
2022
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kiss, Hubert J.
- Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael
- Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Time of origin
- 2022
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