Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium bank runs revisited
Peck and Shell (2003) show that it is possible to get a bank run in a Diamond-Dybvig environment. The mechanism they use, however, is not an optimal one. When an optimal mechanism is used, the bank run equilibrium disappears.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2011-13
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nosal, Ed
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
- (where)
-
Chicago, IL
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nosal, Ed
- Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Time of origin
- 2011
Other Objects (12)
Commitment and equilibrium bank runs
Panic bank runs
Shadow bank runs
Preventing bank runs
Herding and bank runs
Preventing (panic) bank runs
Bank runs, bank competition and opacity
Private Money and Bank Runs
Bank runs without sequential service
Asymmetric information and bank runs
Sovereign defaults, bank runs, and contagion
Why are bank runs sometimes partial?
Commitment and equilibrium bank runs
Panic bank runs
Shadow bank runs
Preventing bank runs
Herding and bank runs
Preventing (panic) bank runs
Bank runs, bank competition and opacity
Private Money and Bank Runs
Bank runs without sequential service
Asymmetric information and bank runs
Sovereign defaults, bank runs, and contagion
Why are bank runs sometimes partial?
Commitment and equilibrium bank runs
Panic bank runs
Shadow bank runs
Preventing bank runs
Herding and bank runs
Preventing (panic) bank runs
Bank runs, bank competition and opacity
Private Money and Bank Runs
Bank runs without sequential service
Asymmetric information and bank runs
Sovereign defaults, bank runs, and contagion