Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments

Arbeitspapier

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a 'specific performance' regime which grants the breached-against buyer an option to choose 'restitution' if the tender's value falls below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 242

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Contract Law ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Labor Contracts ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
• Thema: breach remedies ; imcomplete contracts ; cooperative investments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Stremitzer, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13310
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94090
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13310-1
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ