Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance

Arbeitspapier

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We introduce a new concept, called judicial detection skill, and show that positive judicial detection skill is a prerequisite if the court system is to deter opportunistic suits and simultaneously induce bilateral contractual compliance. The traditional literature on litigation either assumes judges with zero detection skill, or simply neglects that opportunistic suits might be successful. We prove that those models are unable to provide an answer to the question of how to prevent both types of opportunism simultaneously.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 97-07

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Litigation Process ; Contract Law
• Thema: Economic analysis of procedural law ; judicial detection skill ; litigational opportunism ; contractual opportunism ; Rechtsökonomik ; Rechtsanwendung ; Spieltheorie ; Vertrag ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kirstein, Roland ; Schmidtchen, Dieter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
• (wo): Saarbrücken
• (wann): 1997

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23054
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ