Artikel

Information diffusion in networks through social learning

We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new metric of information diffusion in social learning, which is weaker than the traditional aggregation metric. We show that if a minimal connectivity condition holds and neighborhoods are independent, information always diffuses. Diffusion can fail in a well-connected network if neighborhoods are correlated. We show that information diffuses if neighborhood realizations convey little information about the network, as measured by network distortion, or if information asymmetries are captured through beliefs over the state of a finite Markov chain.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 807-851 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Social networks
Bayesian learning
information aggregation
herding

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lobel, Ilan
Sadler, Evan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1549
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Lobel, Ilan
  • Sadler, Evan
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2015

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