Konferenzbeitrag
Taxation and Market Power
We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Economic Consequences of Market Imperfections ; No. D15-V2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
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tax incidence
monopoly
Bertrand competition
experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Morath, Florian
Konrad, Kai A.
Müller, Wieland
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Verein für Socialpolitik
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Morath, Florian
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Müller, Wieland
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Time of origin
- 2010
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