Arbeitspapier
Taxation and market power
We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2880
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
tax incidence
monopoly
Bertrand competition
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Müller, Wieland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Morath, Florian
- Müller, Wieland
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2009
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