Arbeitspapier

Lone Parents, Time-Limited In-Work Credits and the Dynamics of Work and Welfare

Time-limited in-work credits are cheaper, and more targeted, than conventional in-work credits, but are thought to have small to zero long-term impacts. We study two time-limited in-work credits introduced in the mid-2000s in the UK and find they reduced welfare participation and increased employment. Both policies increased job retention once recipients were in work and boosted employment even after the payments were stopped. Conditioning on hours of work was important. Paying a credit to those working 16+ hours a week only increased part-time work, while conditioning on full-time work reduced part-time work and increased full-time work.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10414

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Subject
in-work credits
time-limits
duration model
lone parents

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Brewer, Mike
Cribb, Jonathan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Brewer, Mike
  • Cribb, Jonathan
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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