Arbeitspapier
Election Systems, the "Beauty Premium" in Politics, and the Beauty of Dissent
We ask three questions. First, do election systems differ in how they translate physical attractiveness of candidates into electoral success? Second, do political parties strategically exploit the “beauty premium” when deciding on which candidates to nominate, and, third, do elected MPs use their beauty premium to reap some independence from their party? Using the German election system that combines first-past-the-post election with party-list proportional representation, our results show that plurality elections provide more scope for translating physical attractiveness into electoral success than proportional representation. Whether political parties strategically use the beauty premium to optimize their electoral objectives is less clear. Physically attractive MPs, however, allow themselves to dissent more often, i.e. they vote more often against the party line than their less attractive peers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8296
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Sector Labor Markets
Labor Discrimination: General
- Thema
-
attractiveness of politicians
safe district
party strategies
electoral success
electoral system
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Potrafke, Niklas
Rösch, Marcus
Ursprung, Heinrich
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Potrafke, Niklas
- Rösch, Marcus
- Ursprung, Heinrich
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020
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