Artikel

Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in 'noisy' social exchange

Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence comes from public goods games in which group members are fully informed about the behavior of all others and cheating occurs in full view. We demonstrate that under more realistic information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 18-33 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
public-goods game
punishment
cooperation
reciprocity
experimental games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bornstein, Gary
Weisel, Ori
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2010

DOI
doi:10.3390/g1010018
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Bornstein, Gary
  • Weisel, Ori
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2010

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