Arbeitspapier

Auction performance on wholesale electricity markets in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs

Electricity markets are becoming more integrated around the world. However, the knowledge of the effects of different auction formats on suppliers' strategies in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs is still very limited. In this paper, I analyze the performance of uniform and discriminatory price auctions in the presence of transmission constraints and transmission costs. When the transmission capacity is binding, the discriminatory price auction could outperform the uniform price auction, minimizing the equilibrium price and the transmission costs. Moreover, when the transmission capacity is binding, an increase in transmission costs could be pro-competitive when the auction is discriminatory, but not when the auction is uniform.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1098

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Electric Utilities
Thema
electricity auctions
transmission constraint
transmission costs
market design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Blazquez de Paz, Mario
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Blazquez de Paz, Mario
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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