Arbeitspapier

Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1474

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Stromtarif
Stromnetz
Netzzugang
Unternehmensregulierung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vogelsang, Ingo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vogelsang, Ingo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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