Arbeitspapier
Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation
Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1474
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Stromtarif
Stromnetz
Netzzugang
Unternehmensregulierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vogelsang, Ingo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vogelsang, Ingo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2005