Arbeitspapier

Managing wages: Fairness norms of low- and high-performing team members

Services are often provided by groups. The question of remuneration arises both at the group level and for each individual group member. We examine the question of how relative pay should be designed within the group if all group members are to regard the payment scheme as fair. We use a three-step laboratory experiment to compare which fairness norms are chosen by high-performing and low-performing group members. It turns out that both types of group members prefer the performance pay principle. Support for equal pay is negligible. However, the low performers use their bargaining power to improve their position, but without deviating from the performance principle substantially. A random influence on the performance of the players does not change the results.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: arqus Discussion Paper ; No. 238

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
performance principle
fairness norms
relative remuneration

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fochmann, Martin
Sachs, Florian
Weimann, Joachim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fochmann, Martin
  • Sachs, Florian
  • Weimann, Joachim
  • Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)

Time of origin

  • 2019

Other Objects (12)