Arbeitspapier

On the private provision of contentious public characteristics

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3881

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Subject
public goods
public bads
aggregative games
Öffentliches Gut
Allokation
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cornes, Richard
  • Rübbelke, Dirk
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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