Arbeitspapier
On the private provision of contentious public characteristics
We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3881
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
- Subject
-
public goods
public bads
aggregative games
Öffentliches Gut
Allokation
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cornes, Richard
- Rübbelke, Dirk
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2012