Arbeitspapier
Competition for promotion can induce household specialization between equally competitive spouses
We analyze equally competitive spouses competing for promotion in their respective workplaces and show that an asymmetric equilibrium featuring household specialization can arise. Examples where the asymmetric equilibrium is welfare-superior to the symmetric equilibrium are highlighted. By investing heavily in the career of only one spouse, families reduce the intensity of the rat race of the working environment and obtain less risky consumption opportunities. Our findings suggest that specialization can reflect an efficient response to the competitiveness of the labor market and may arise even when all workers have equal opportunities to succeed in the labor market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 155
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Labor Discrimination
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
contest theory
gender equality
family
household
competition
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bastani, Spencer
Dickmanns, Lisa
Giebe, Thomas
Gürtler, Oliver
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (wo)
-
Bonn and Cologne
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bastani, Spencer
- Dickmanns, Lisa
- Giebe, Thomas
- Gürtler, Oliver
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Entstanden
- 2022