Competition for promotion can induce household specialization between equally competitive spouses

Arbeitspapier

We analyze equally competitive spouses competing for promotion in their respective workplaces and show that an asymmetric equilibrium featuring household specialization can arise. Examples where the asymmetric equilibrium is welfare-superior to the symmetric equilibrium are highlighted. By investing heavily in the career of only one spouse, families reduce the intensity of the rat race of the working environment and obtain less risky consumption opportunities. Our findings suggest that specialization can reflect an efficient response to the competitiveness of the labor market and may arise even when all workers have equal opportunities to succeed in the labor market.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 155

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination ; Labor Discrimination ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: contest theory ; gender equality ; family ; household ; competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bastani, Spencer ; Dickmanns, Lisa ; Giebe, Thomas ; Gürtler, Oliver
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (where): Bonn and Cologne
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/262099
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET