Behavior-based price discrimination in the domestic and international mixed duopoly

Arbeitspapier

This study investigates mixed markets in which a social welfare-maximizing public firm and a private firm engage in behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). Total of two cases are considered: one where domestic shareholders completely own the private firm and one where foreign shareholders completely own it. In the domestic mixed duopoly, BBPD is irrelevant from the viewpoint of social welfare. This is because poaching does not occur. In the international mixed duopoly, BBPD improves domestic social welfare, as it allows the public firm to lower its poaching price. In both cases, privatization is more undesirable under BBPD than uniform pricing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1179

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Publicly Provided Private Goods ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Behavior-based price discrimination ; Mixed oligopoly ; Foreign firms ; Privatization

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Okuyama, Suzuka
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/267791
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET