Arbeitspapier

Consumer flexibility, data quality and location choice

We analyze firms' location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters (flexibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer flexibility. We show that firms' location choices depend on how strongly consumers differ in flexibility. Precisely, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, equilibrium locations are socially optimal regardless of the quality of customer flexibility data. However, when consumers are relatively differentiated, firms make socially optimal location choices only when customer flexibility data is perfect. These results are driven by the optimal strategy of a firm on its turf, monopolization or market-sharing, which in turn depends on consumer heterogeneity in flexibility. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows firms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters.

ISBN
978-3-86304-138-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 139

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location: General
Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Thema
Location Choice
Price Discrimination
Customer Data

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baye, Irina
Hasnas, Irina
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baye, Irina
  • Hasnas, Irina
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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