Arbeitspapier
Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms
Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support generation owners. Capacity payments can mitigate imperfections associated with "missing money" in the spot market and solve transitory capacity shortages caused by investment cycles, regulatory changes, or technology shifts. We discuss capacity mechanisms used in different electricity markets around the world. We argue that strategic reserves, if correctly designed, are likely to be more efficient than market-wide capacity mechanisms. This is especially so in electricity markets that rely on substantial amounts of intermittent generation, hydro power, and energy storage whose available capacity varies with circumstances and is difficult to estimate.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1387
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
Market Design
Energy: General
Energy: Government Policy
- Subject
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Capacity mechanism
Market design
Reliability
Resource efficiency
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Holmberg, Pär
Tangerås, Thomas P.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
- (where)
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Stockholm
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Holmberg, Pär
- Tangerås, Thomas P.
- Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Time of origin
- 2021