Arbeitspapier

Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms

Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support generation owners. Capacity payments can mitigate imperfections associated with "missing money" in the spot market and solve transitory capacity shortages caused by investment cycles, regulatory changes, or technology shifts. We discuss capacity mechanisms used in different electricity markets around the world. We argue that strategic reserves, if correctly designed, are likely to be more efficient than market-wide capacity mechanisms. This is especially so in electricity markets that rely on substantial amounts of intermittent generation, hydro power, and energy storage whose available capacity varies with circumstances and is difficult to estimate.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1387

Classification
Wirtschaft
Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
Market Design
Energy: General
Energy: Government Policy
Subject
Capacity mechanism
Market design
Reliability
Resource efficiency

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Holmberg, Pär
Tangerås, Thomas P.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Holmberg, Pär
  • Tangerås, Thomas P.
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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