Arbeitspapier
Collusion and research joint ventures
We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated-game framework. Innovation under competitive R&D creates inter-firm asymmetries, which destabilizes the collusive equilibrium. Innovation sharing through cooperative R&D preserves symmetries, thereby facilitating collusion. Sharing an efficient technology also increases industry profit, which contributes to the collusion stability but also raises social welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement is less likely if innovation leads to a large cost reduction. The effect of licensing under competition R&D is also examined.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 704
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
Collusion
Research Joint Ventures
Innovation
R&D
Forschungskooperation
Joint Venture
Kartell
Industrieforschung
Innovation
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Miyagiwa, Kaz
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2007