Arbeitspapier

Collusion and research joint ventures

We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated-game framework. Innovation under competitive R&D creates inter-firm asymmetries, which destabilizes the collusive equilibrium. Innovation sharing through cooperative R&D preserves symmetries, thereby facilitating collusion. Sharing an efficient technology also increases industry profit, which contributes to the collusion stability but also raises social welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement is less likely if innovation leads to a large cost reduction. The effect of licensing under competition R&D is also examined.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 704

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Collusion
Research Joint Ventures
Innovation
R&D
Forschungskooperation
Joint Venture
Kartell
Industrieforschung
Innovation
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Miyagiwa, Kaz
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Miyagiwa, Kaz
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)