Research Joint Ventures, Licensing, and Industrial Policy

Arbeitspapier

This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the export oligopoly game. Nevertheless, national governments are driven to subsidize their own national firms in order to increase their strength in the joint venture bargaining game. Therefore, our analysis suggests an alternative explanation of the observed proliferation of R&D subsidies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 89

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Thema: patent licensing ; industrial organization ; R&D subsidies ; research joint ventures ; innovation policy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fan, Cuihong ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13462
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93876
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13462-5
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ