The Ontology of Social Agency

Abstract: The main claim of the paper is that there are irreducibly social agents that intentionally perform social actions. It argues, first, that there are social attitudes ascribable to social agents and not to the individuals involved. Second, that social agents, not only individual agents, are capable of what Weber called “subjectively understandable action.” And, third, that although action (if not merely mental) presumes an agent’s moving her body in various ways, actions do not consist of such movements, and hence not only individual persons but social groups are genuine agents. We should be pluralists about individuation, rejecting both individualism and collectivism by granting that social agency is neither more nor less ultimate, well-founded, or basic than non-social agency.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: The Ontology of Social Agency ; volume:30 ; number:2 ; year:2008 ; pages:533-551 ; extent:19 ; Analyse & Kritik ; 30, Heft 2 (2008), 533-551 (gesamt 19)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Stoutland, Frederick

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/auk-2008-0210
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171627532.224121827733
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:46 AM CEST