Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
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Handel, Kommunikation, Verkehr
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
[Wadern]
- (wer)
-
[Internat. Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik]
- (wann)
-
[2005]
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Day, Robert W.
Raghavan, S.
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1832
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:51 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Day, Robert W.
- Raghavan, S.
- [Internat. Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik]
Entstanden
- [2005]
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