The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An Argument Against Compatibilism

Abstract: This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briefly discuss the standard incompatibilist argument-the so-called consequence argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others, reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An Argument Against Compatibilism ; volume:1 ; number:26 ; year:2012 ; pages:56-89 ; extent:34
Kriterion ; 1, Heft 26 (2012), 56-89 (gesamt 34)

Urheber
Caruso, Gregg D.

DOI
10.1515/krt-2012-012606
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090314562078721533
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
15.08.2025, 07:31 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Caruso, Gregg D.

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