Arbeitspapier

Why is fiscal policy often procyclical?

Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1556

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Finanzpolitik
Konjunktur
Public Choice
Wahlverhalten
Korruption
Theorie
OECD-Staaten
Entwicklungsländer

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Alesina, Alberto
Tabellini, Guido
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Alesina, Alberto
  • Tabellini, Guido
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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