Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks

We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider's (CP) investment incentives in quality of services (QoS). We find that the effects crucially depend on network capacity levels. With limited capacity, as in mobile networks, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP's investments and can facilitate entry of congestion-sensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. By contrast, if capacity is relatively large, as in fixed-line networks, prioritized services reduce QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improves traffic management. These results are qualitatively robust to the extension of the ISP's endogenous choice of network capacity.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4974

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Regulation and Business Law: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Subject
net neutrality
asymmetric regulation
quality of service
investment incentives
queuing
congestion
mobile/fixed networks

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Choi, Jay Pil
Jeon, Doh-Shin
Kim, Byung-Cheol
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Choi, Jay Pil
  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Kim, Byung-Cheol
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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