Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Anti drug policy: fighting for migration?
"Supply restricting anti-drug policy is inefficient from an economic point of view, but is nevertheless widely used. This paper explains this phenomenon as individually rational behavior for local government. Because supply restrictions give addicts an incentive to migrate it has an external effect. This effect makes a policy of supply restrictions individually rational but leads to socially wasteful competition between local governments in a federal system." (author's abstract)
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge (91-08)
- Subject
-
Soziale Probleme und Sozialdienste
soziale Probleme
Drogenpolitik
Rationalität
Verhalten
Drogenkonsum
ökonomische Faktoren
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Konrad, Kai A.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
-
Deutschland
- (when)
-
1991
- Handle
- Last update
-
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 1991
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