Arbeitspapier

Are banks less likely to issue equity when they are less capitalized?

Debt overhang and moral hazard related to risk-shifting opportunities predict that low capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to issue equity. In contrast to this view, for an international sample of bank Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), we show that the likelihood of issuing an SEO is generally higher in low capitalized banks. We provide a series of tests exploring the variation of capital regulation, systemic conditions and market discipline to understand the driving forces behind this result. We find that market mechanisms rather than capital regulation are the primary, key driver of the decision to issue by low capitalized banks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 100

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
SEOs
Banking Regulation
Banking Crises
Counter-cyclical capital regulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dinger, Valeriya
Vallascas, Francesco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osnabrück University, Institute of Empirical Economic Research
(wo)
Osnabrück
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dinger, Valeriya
  • Vallascas, Francesco
  • Osnabrück University, Institute of Empirical Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2014

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