Arbeitspapier

Consistency and unanimity in the house allocation problems I: Collective initial endowments

This paper studies allocation correspondences in the house allocation problems with collective initial endowments. We examine the implications of two axioms, namely 'consistency' and 'unanimity.' Consistency requires the allocation correspondence be invariant under reductions of population. Unanimity requires the allocation correspondence respect unanimity, that is, it assigns to every agent the object that ranks best for him whenever possible. We prove that if an allocation correspondence satisfies these two axioms, then it is a subcorrespondence of the Pareto correspondence. Further, we give a characterization of the Pareto correspondence using a version of 'converse consistency.'

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 657

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Thema
house allocation problem
axiomatic characterization
consistency
unanimity
Pareto efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Takamiya, Koji
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Takamiya, Koji
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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