Arbeitspapier
Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation
This paper examines the equivalence among price-modifying and quantity fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff-quota equivalence holds, but it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy prefers a quantityequivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 392
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Calzolari, Giacomo
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2000
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4909
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Calzolari, Giacomo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2000
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