Arbeitspapier

Settlement risk under gross and net settlement

Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 99-10a

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Payment systems
Risk

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kahn, Charles M.
McAndrews, James
Roberds, William
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(where)
Atlanta, GA
(when)
1999

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kahn, Charles M.
  • McAndrews, James
  • Roberds, William
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Time of origin

  • 1999

Other Objects (12)