Arbeitspapier
Settlement risk under gross and net settlement
Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement. We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement in the absence of delivery versus payment requirements. In addition, we show that net settlement can economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 99-10a
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Payment systems
Risk
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kahn, Charles M.
McAndrews, James
Roberds, William
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
- (where)
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Atlanta, GA
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kahn, Charles M.
- McAndrews, James
- Roberds, William
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Time of origin
- 1999