Arbeitspapier

Litigation and settlement under court error

Settlements are often considered to be welfare-enhancing because they save time and litigation costs. In the presence of court error, however, this conclusion may be wrong. Court decisions create positive externalities for future litigants which will not occur if a dispute is settled out of court. Focusing on private litigation, we examine the impact of court error on the deterrent effect of the strict liability rule. In an asymmetric information setup both, underdeterrence and overdeterrence are possible under court error. Moreover, court error increases the likelihood of out-of-court settlements which can offset the positive externality of litigation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 10-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Litigation Process
Thema
litigation
settlement
asymmetric information
court error
strict liability rule
Rechtsprechung
Zivilprozess
Verhandlungen
Asymmetrische Information
Rechtsökonomik

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ackermann, Philipp
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(wo)
Bern
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ackermann, Philipp
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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