Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: Evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform

Arbeitspapier

This paper looks at a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the benefit size structure as for some unemployed persons, benefits from the SI are higher than benefits from the UI. We use a reform of the SI system that came in force 1 July, 2003, to identify the effect of economic incentives arising from the different benefit sizes. Our results from a duration analysis show clearly that the higher the benefits, the larger the probability of reporting sick.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2007:8

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Subject: Unemployment insurance ; sickness insurance ; health ; duration analysis ; discrete hazard models ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Moral Hazard ; Statistische Bestandsanalyse ; Schweden

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Larsson, Laura ; Runeson, Caroline
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (where): Uppsala
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78678
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET