Arbeitspapier
Regulating national firms in a common market
We consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized bargaining solution.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2209
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Economic Integration
- Subject
-
regulation
competition
market integration
cost of public funds
Marktintegration
Regulierung
Wettbewerb
Makroökonomischer Einfluss
Gesamtwirtschaftliches Anlagevermögen
Agency Theory
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Biancini, Sara
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Biancini, Sara
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2008
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