Arbeitspapier

Petro Populism

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking incumbent who only cares about his own welfare, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Our model explains how resource wealth may generate political competition that reduces the tenability of equilibrium policies.

ISBN
978-82-7553-670-7
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012/06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Resource Booms
Thema
resource curse
political economy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Matsen, Egil
Natvik, Gisle James
Torvik, Ragnar
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Matsen, Egil
  • Natvik, Gisle James
  • Torvik, Ragnar
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2012

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