Job assignment with multivariate skills

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the job assignment problem faced by a firm when workers' skills are distributed along several dimensions and jobs require different skills to varying extent. I derive optimal assignment rules with and without slot constraints, and show that under certain circumstances workers may get promoted although in their new job they are expected to be less productive than in their old job. This can be interpreted as a version of the Peter Principle which states that workers get promoted up to their level of incompetence.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,25

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion ; Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Thema: job assignment ; worker selection ; internal hiring ; Peter Principle ; slot constraints ; multi-dimensional skills ; Personaleinsatzplanung ; Qualifikation ; Anforderungsprofil ; Erwerbsverlauf ; Arbeitsproduktivität ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Brilon, Stefanie
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38879
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ