Arbeitspapier

To Save or Save Not: Intergenerational Neutrality and the Expansion of New Zealand Superannuation

Increases in longevity mean the size of New Zealand's public retirement income programme, New Zealand Superannuation, will automatically expand unless the age of eligibility is increased. This paper analyses the consequences of expanding New Zealand Superannuation on a save-as-you-go basis through the New Zealand Superannuation Fund rather than on a pay-as-you-go basis. These funding mechanisms differ in terms of their effects on different cohorts, on long run tax rates, on capital accumulation, and on risk. The paper argues that an automatic pay-as-you-go funded expansion of New Zealand Superannuation is unattractive on many grounds, even if pay-as-you-go funding remains for much of the programme. In addition to reducing long run tax rates, the use of save-as-you-go funding through the New Zealand Superannuation Fund provides households with a means of reducing income risk over the course of their lives.

ISBN
978-0-478-42112-5
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: New Zealand Treasury Working Paper ; No. 14/02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth
Social Security and Public Pensions
Subject
Retirement income policy
prefunding
intergenerational economics
Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung
Umlageverfahren
Kapitaldeckungsverfahren
Altersvorsorge
Neuseeland

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Coleman, Andrew
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
New Zealand Government, The Treasury
(where)
Wellington
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Coleman, Andrew
  • New Zealand Government, The Treasury

Time of origin

  • 2014

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