Artikel

Founder control, ownership structure and firm value: Evidence from entrepreneurial listed firms in China

In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and their cash flow rights (hereafter 'DVC') in the listed firms is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling shareholders' opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve firm efficiency. This study uses 229 listed firms ultimately controlled by individuals or families (hereafter 'entrepreneurial firms') for 2004 in China, to investigate the effect of DVC on firm value and to determine whether it is different between founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive effect on firm value for founder controlled firms. This result implies that investors believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled firms than by non-founder controlled firms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1755-3091 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2008 ; Pages: 31-49 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation
Management
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
Founder Control
Ownership Structure
Firm Value
China
Tunneling

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Xia, Lijun
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier
(wo)
Amsterdam
(wann)
2008

DOI
doi:10.1016/S1755-3091(13)60004-0
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Xia, Lijun
  • Elsevier

Entstanden

  • 2008

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