Arbeitspapier

Evasione fiscale delle imprese

Theory of tax evasion is reviewed. The Marrelli approach is studied in a more general environment. Indirect tax evasion by firms is extended to the general case of oligopolic markets with a conjectural variations model and either a price discrimination model, considering both ad valorem and specific taxation. From the normative point of view, cut-off rules of tax enforcement are studied and modified inverse elasticity rules for optimal taxation are derived and shown to depend on the level of distortion on the supply side, i.e. on firms` collusion, shifting and tax evasion decisions.

Sprache
Italienisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 321

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Etro, Federico Gabriele
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
1998

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4987
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Etro, Federico Gabriele
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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