Arbeitspapier
Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 570
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
inequality
self-enforcing
collective action
infrastructure
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bardhan, Pranab
Singh, Nirvikar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of California, Economics Department
- (where)
-
Santa Cruz, CA
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bardhan, Pranab
- Singh, Nirvikar
- University of California, Economics Department
Time of origin
- 2004
Other Objects (12)
Coalitions and collective action
Spontaneous Collective Action
Networks and Collective Action
A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality
Stable coalitions
Community aspirations and collective action
The Logic of Collective Action Revisited
Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?
Collective Action, Strategic Behaviour and Endogenous Growth
Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems
Inequality in Collective Action Problems
Coalitions and collective action
Spontaneous Collective Action
Networks and Collective Action
A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality
Stable coalitions
Community aspirations and collective action
The Logic of Collective Action Revisited
Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?
Collective Action, Strategic Behaviour and Endogenous Growth
Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems
Inequality in Collective Action Problems
Coalitions and collective action
Spontaneous Collective Action
Networks and Collective Action
A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem: Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality
Stable coalitions
Community aspirations and collective action
The Logic of Collective Action Revisited
Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?
Collective Action, Strategic Behaviour and Endogenous Growth
Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems