Arbeitspapier
Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 570
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
inequality
self-enforcing
collective action
infrastructure
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bardhan, Pranab
Singh, Nirvikar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Economics Department
- (wo)
-
Santa Cruz, CA
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bardhan, Pranab
- Singh, Nirvikar
- University of California, Economics Department
Entstanden
- 2004
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