Arbeitspapier
Public Provision and Local Income Tax Competition
We extend the literature on local income tax competition by allowing for inter-jurisdictional spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of a publicly provided good. Comparing decentralized second-best results of a theoretical model with an efficient benchmark, we identify three inefficiencies: (1) imperfect redistribution; (2) inter-community free-riding; and (3) an inefficient allocation of the population. We quantify the relative size of these inefficiencies in a numerical implementation of the theoretical model, which reveals that free-riding rises unambiguously in the level of spillovers, whereas the welfare losses from (1) and (3) depend nonlinearly on the levels of spillovers and rivalry.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5789
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
publicly provided goods
tax competition
fiscal federalism
decentralization
free-riding
welfare analysis
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kuhlmey, Florian
Hintermann, Beat
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kuhlmey, Florian
- Hintermann, Beat
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016