Arbeitspapier

Public Provision and Local Income Tax Competition

We extend the literature on local income tax competition by allowing for inter-jurisdictional spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of a publicly provided good. Comparing decentralized second-best results of a theoretical model with an efficient benchmark, we identify three inefficiencies: (1) imperfect redistribution; (2) inter-community free-riding; and (3) an inefficient allocation of the population. We quantify the relative size of these inefficiencies in a numerical implementation of the theoretical model, which reveals that free-riding rises unambiguously in the level of spillovers, whereas the welfare losses from (1) and (3) depend nonlinearly on the levels of spillovers and rivalry.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5789

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Thema
publicly provided goods
tax competition
fiscal federalism
decentralization
free-riding
welfare analysis

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kuhlmey, Florian
Hintermann, Beat
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kuhlmey, Florian
  • Hintermann, Beat
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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