- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-7187
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium ; day:17 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-14
Theory and decision ; (17.6.2021), 1-14
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11238-021-09824-1
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021101200483989218411
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.08.2025, 07:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Brams, Steven J.
- Ismail, Mehmet S.
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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