- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-7187
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium ; day:17 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-14
Theory and decision ; (17.6.2021), 1-14
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11238-021-09824-1
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021101200483989218411
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
- 15.08.2025, 7:25 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Brams, Steven J.
- Ismail, Mehmet S.
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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