New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment

Arbeitspapier

This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional cooperation is made significantly worse when other players contribute more unequally. Contingent punishment strategies are found to increase with decreasing contributions by the target player and also increasing contributions by a third player. Antisocial punishments are not directed specifically toward high contributors, but may be motivated by pre-emptive retaliation against punishment a player expects to incur.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5689

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Public Goods
• Subject: conditional cooperation ; selfish bias ; punishment ; public good experiment ; strategy method

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cheung, Stephen L.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52009
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201105173253
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET