Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

Arbeitspapier

This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-145-8
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 146

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Thema: Cournot ; Bertrand ; vertical relations ; two-part tariffs

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Alipranti, Maria ; Milliou, Chrysovalantou ; Petrakis, Emmanuel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (wo): Düsseldorf
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96924
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ