Bilateral Search with Horizontal Heterogeneity

Konferenzbeitrag

We study a matching model with heterogenous agents, nontransferable utility and search frictions. Agents differ along a continuous horizontal dimension (e.g. taste) and a discrete vertical dimension, e.g. income. All individuals prefer the highest type along the vertical trait, but have different preferences regarding the horizontal trait. We characterize the equilibrium and study how matching occurs depending on the frictions in the market if income is exogenous. If the level of search frictions is low, assortative mating along both dimensions occurs. For greater levels of search frictions, equilibria with and without income segregation are possible. Finally, we study the impact of a redistributive tax on social welfare if agents decide on their effort levels before they enter the matching market.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams ; No. F12-V3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
• Subject: Matching ; Taste ; Marriage Markets ; Redistributive Taxation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hofmann, Dirk ; Qari, Salmai
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37382
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET