Konferenzbeitrag
Bilateral Search with Horizontal Heterogeneity
We study a matching model with heterogenous agents, nontransferable utility and search frictions. Agents differ along a continuous horizontal dimension (e.g. taste) and a discrete vertical dimension, e.g. income. All individuals prefer the highest type along the vertical trait, but have different preferences regarding the horizontal trait. We characterize the equilibrium and study how matching occurs depending on the frictions in the market if income is exogenous. If the level of search frictions is low, assortative mating along both dimensions occurs. For greater levels of search frictions, equilibria with and without income segregation are possible. Finally, we study the impact of a redistributive tax on social welfare if agents decide on their effort levels before they enter the matching market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams ; No. F12-V3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- Thema
-
Matching
Taste
Marriage Markets
Redistributive Taxation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hofmann, Dirk
Qari, Salmai
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Hofmann, Dirk
- Qari, Salmai
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The law of attraction bilateral search and horizontal heterogeneity
Search Cost and Search Duration for New Hires
Horizontal and Vertical Concept Transitions
Empirical welfare analysis with preference heterogeneity
Vacancies and residential search in an empirical equilibrium search model
Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments
Spatial Heterogeneity and the Wage Curve Revisited
On specifying heterogeneity in knowledge production functions
Firms' Heterogeneity, Endogenous Entry, and Exit Decisions
Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility
Firm Heterogeneity and Regional Business Cycles Differentials
Should Central Banks Consider Household Inflation Heterogeneity?
The law of attraction bilateral search and horizontal heterogeneity
Search Cost and Search Duration for New Hires
Horizontal and Vertical Concept Transitions
Empirical welfare analysis with preference heterogeneity
Vacancies and residential search in an empirical equilibrium search model
Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments
Spatial Heterogeneity and the Wage Curve Revisited
On specifying heterogeneity in knowledge production functions
Firms' Heterogeneity, Endogenous Entry, and Exit Decisions
Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility
Firm Heterogeneity and Regional Business Cycles Differentials
Should Central Banks Consider Household Inflation Heterogeneity?
The law of attraction bilateral search and horizontal heterogeneity
Search Cost and Search Duration for New Hires
Horizontal and Vertical Concept Transitions
Empirical welfare analysis with preference heterogeneity
Vacancies and residential search in an empirical equilibrium search model
Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments
Spatial Heterogeneity and the Wage Curve Revisited
On specifying heterogeneity in knowledge production functions
Firms' Heterogeneity, Endogenous Entry, and Exit Decisions
Workplace Heterogeneity and the Returns to Versatility
Firm Heterogeneity and Regional Business Cycles Differentials