Trade policy and illegal immigration

Arbeitspapier

We use a version of the Meade model to consider the effects of interdependent import tariffs in the presence illegal immigration. First, we consider the small union case and derive the Nash tariff equilibrium for two potential members of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). We analyze conditions under which a movement from the Nash equilibrium to complete intra-bloc tariff elimination (FTA) is likely to be welfare augmenting. The paper also considers how reduction of the external tariff may impact the Nash equilibrium tariffs of the potential bloc members. The analysis is extended to the large union case to consider the conditions under which terms of trade of bloc members improve with respect to the non-member nation(s).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1568

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Neoclassical Models of Trade ; International Migration
• Thema: preferential trade agreement ; illegal immigration ; optimal tariff

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu ; Takashima, Ryo
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33482
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ